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This study investigates how shared picture book storytelling within a peer-group setting could stimu-
late causal reasoning in children aged 4 1/2 to 6 years. Twenty-eight children from preschool classes of
three schools were allocated to one of six groups (four to five children per group). Each group partic-
ipated in six storytelling sessions over a period of 2 weeks. During these sessions, the children freely
generated stories from stimuli in two picture books. Storytelling discourse was analyzed in the groups
that showed the lowest and the highest pre- to postintervention improvement on a series of causal rea-
soning tasks. In the most-improving group, discourse was distinguished by detailed interpretations of
perceptual features, causal explanations, and explicit justifications of statements. The least-improv-
ing group was distinguished by “superficial” talk (i.e., labeling perceptual features, simple inferences,
uncritical acceptance of statements, and disagreements). These types of discourse could be related to
time spent on storytelling. The findings generate hypotheses for future research on stimulating causal
reasoning in early childhood education.
Keywords: preschoolers, causal reasoning, narratives, peer interaction, picture books
Causal reasoning can be broadly defined as the ability to understand relationships with a cause
and an effect. Children’s capacity for causal reasoning is fundamental to understanding the
dynamic physical and social environments they confront every day (Hickling & Wellman, 2001;
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368 REED ET AL.
Schlottman, Allen, Linderoth, & Hesketh, 2002; Wellman & Liu, 2007). It allows them to under-
stand past events, predict future outcomes, and influence what happens in the world (Gopnik
et al., 2004). Later on, children need this capacity to be successful at school, where much of the
formal thinking underlying school subjects—including mathematics, natural sciences, and read-
ing comprehension—is causal in nature (Devlin, 2000; Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000; Van den Broek
et al., 2005).
This study investigates how causal reasoning could be stimulated in preschool children (ages
4 1/2 – 6 years) through shared picture book storytelling within a peer-group setting. We dis-
tinguish three types of causal reasoning. In causal inference, a conclusion is drawn about a
connection between an antecedent and an outcome (Das Gupta & Bryant, 1989; Gopnik et al.,
2004). Causal explanations describe mechanisms that act on antecedents to produce particular
outcomes (Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, 2010). Causal predictions
are made about the outcome of an event, assuming a particular causal mechanism (Bonawitz
et al., 2010).
Causal Reasoning in Young Children
Causal reasoning emerges early in life, with the ability to perceive cause-and-effect relation-
ships among physical events appearing in infancy. Leslie and Keeble (1987) showed 6-month-old
infants films of so-called launching events. In the “direct launching” film, a moving object col-
lides with a stationary object, directly setting it in motion. In the “delayed reaction” film, the
second object only begins to move after a delay of a half-second. Adults and children perceive a
“direct launching” event as causal but a “delayed reaction” event as noncausal. After habituation
to one of these films, the same film was shown to the infants in reverse. Although spatiotemporal
change was identical for both films, only the reversed “direct launching” film created a novel
causal event (i.e., the second object now caused the first object to move). Infants showed more
dishabituation to the reversed “direct launching” film than to the reversed “delayed reaction” film,
suggesting that they were perceiving the causal events.
As children get older, they develop more sophisticated causal reasoning skills. Gopnik et al.
(2004) devised a series of experiments that required children to work out which objects would
activate a novel machine and how to intervene to make it stop. The machine lit up and played
music when certain objects—but not others—were placed on it. By exposing children to dif-
ferent patterns of covariation relationships between the objects and the machine’s behavior, the
researchers showed that 2- to 4-year-olds can infer causal relationships from observing patterns
of covariation among events in the world around them. Four-year-olds also can infer how causal
agents can bring about transformations in objects. Das Gupta and Bryant (1989) showed that 4-
year olds, but not 3-year-olds, can readily infer what causes a change in an object that starts out
as noncanonical in one way (e.g., a broken cup) and ends up as noncanonical in two ways (e.g.,
a wet, broken cup) and also can infer what causes a change from a noncanonical state (e.g., wet
cup) to a canonical state (e.g., dry cup).
Furthermore, young children seek and provide causal explanations for natural events, human
activity, and psychological states. Hickling and Wellman (2001) found that children’s every-
day causal explanations during the toddler and preschool years incorporate various types of
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CAUSAL REASONING AND PICTURE BOOK STORYTELLING 369
causality (e.g., physical, psychological, biological). More recently, Legare et al. (2010) found
that children’s causal explanations are especially triggered by events that are inconsistent with
prior knowledge, suggesting that children’s explanations function in the service of discovery.
Young children also make causal predictions about future events. Bonawitz et al. (2010)
showed 2- and 4-year-olds two events in a predictive relation: a block was moved to contact
a base following which a toy connected to the base lit up and spun. After this sequence was
shown several times, a trial was presented in which the block contacted the base but the toy did
not activate. Almost all children predictively looked at the toy; however, only the older children
spontaneously intervened to activate it by moving the block to the base.
Although more complex (e.g., multivariable) causal reasoning abilities continue to develop
up to 6 or 7 years or older (Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000; Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001), the ability
to think about causal relationships appears quite robust by the time children enter early child-
hood education. Nonetheless, there are important preconditions for competent causal reasoning:
young children use prior knowledge and experience of causal structures and mechanisms to
learn new causal relationships and to make causal inferences and predictions (Gopnik et al.,
2004; Goswami, 2008; Schlottman, 2001). There are, however, important individual differences
in young children’s causal knowledge and experience, stemming from variability in home con-
text. Specifically, the frequency and type of talk engaged in between parents and children affects
children’s understanding of the causes and consequences of everyday events and human behavior
(Wellman & Liu, 2007). Consequently, some young children may lack much exposure to causal
reasoning, which makes it important to provide activities that can stimulate these skills in early
childhood education.
Causal Reasoning in Narrative Construction
A fundamental way in which children apply causal reasoning is in constructing narratives—alone
or in conversation with parents and peers—that help them derive meaning from their experiences
(Bruner, 1990; Nelson, 2007). Narratives are stories that construct relationships between charac-
ters, actions, events, motivations, and emotions, based on contextual clues and prior knowledge
(Paris & Paris, 2003).
Narratives typically involve several types of causality. Physical causality refers to interactions
between physical entities (e.g., a moving object bumping into a stationary one and setting it in
motion), whereas psychological causality refers to how the behavior of characters is related to
mental states (e.g., laughing because you are happy) (Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Schlottman
et al., 2002). Within the context of narratives, it is important to distinguish a third type of causal-
ity, which we refer to as situational causality. This reflects the view that narratives involve mental
representations of depicted or described situations that include causal connections between var-
ious story elements (Van den Broek et al., 2005; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Thus, behavior
and mental states could be connected to particular events (e.g., someone becoming upset because
they are trapped), events from different parts of the story can be connected (e.g., someone slipping
and falling because they dropped a banana peel earlier on), single events can have multiple causes
(e.g., a wild fire requires a long dry period and a discarded match or cigarette), and a single cause
can lead to multiple events (e.g., a flood can destroy buildings, uproot trees, and wash vehicles
away) (Van den Broek et al., 2005; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).
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370 REED ET AL.
Through constructing narratives, children thus learn to form coherent and meaningful repre-
sentations that include concepts about causal relationships between various story elements (Lever
& Sénéchal, 2011; Paris & Paris, 2003). When children construct narratives that make sense of
pictorial stimuli, they also make inferences, form predications, and provide explanations that
enable them to form coherent accounts of causally sequenced plots (Paris & Paris, 2003). In a
study by O’Neill, Pearce, and Pick (2004) that individually measured young children’s narra-
tive skills, preschoolers showed this kind of reasoning when narrating a picture book story that
depicted different mental states in the context of characters interacting (e.g., seeing a frog in
her salad causes a diner to react with surprise and anger). Walsh (2003) also showed that chil-
dren’s oral responses to picture books include cause-and-effect reasoning, as well as labeling (i.e.,
naming or identifying elements of pictures) and detailed observations of perceptual features.
By around age 5 years, many children are able to produce well-structured, coherent, and
cohesive narratives (Schick & Melzi, 2010). Narrative abilities are also amenable to interven-
tion. Peterson, Jesso, and McCabe (1999) helped mothers stimulate disadvantaged preschoolers’
narrative skills by spending more time in narrative conversation, asking more open-ended and
context-eliciting questions, and encouraging longer narratives. One year postintervention, these
children showed overall improvements in narrative skill, including more descriptions of when
and where events took place. Hayward and Schneider (2000) taught narrative skills to preschool-
ers with language impairments through a number of activities, including sorting and sequencing
elements, identifying missing elements, and reformulating scrambled stories. Postintervention,
children included more story information and produced more complex stories when generat-
ing narratives. In a study by Spencer and Slocum (2010), preschoolers with narrative language
delays were taught narrative structure in a story-retell context using picture sequences and icons.
Children made substantial gains in narrative retelling and personal story generation. Thus, inter-
ventions in which young children are encouraged to engage in narrative activities appear to
stimulate their narrative abilities.
Reasoning Through Peer Interaction
A further learning perspective relevant to the present study comes from sociocultural research:
children’s learning and development are significantly shaped by social and communicative inter-
actions with peers (Howe & Mercer, 2010). Under appropriate conditions, peer interaction during
learning tasks can stimulate children to think aloud, share knowledge, explore and extend ideas,
clarify or defend their own points of view, challenge others’ ideas, and provide alternative
hypotheses or interpretations (Howe & Mercer, 2010; Mercer & Howe, 2012). These types of
interaction typify what is known as “exploratory talk.” Importantly, appropriate conditions for
facilitating this kind of talk include the absence of directive control by the teacher, whose role
instead focuses on enabling participants to engage openly and equitably with each other’s views
(Mercer & Howe, 2012). While exploratory talk is considered a desirable and effective form of
peer interaction, commonly observed types of interaction in primary school classrooms are less
effective. “Disputational talk” is characterized by disagreement and short exchanges of assertions
and counter-assertions. With “cumulative talk,” speakers build uncritically on each other’s state-
ments by repeating, confirming, completing, or elaborating on what has gone before (Howe &
Mercer, 2010).
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CAUSAL REASONING AND PICTURE BOOK STORYTELLING 371
Although previous research has largely focused on older children (≥ 8 years) and adoles-
cents, preschoolers also justify opinions, suggest alternatives, and reach compromises during
free play with siblings or peers (Ehrlich, 2011; Howe & McWilliam, 2001). When preschoolers
share stories with peers, they take on different roles than when interacting with adults: engag-
ing actively with each other, requesting clarification, providing feedback, supporting each other’s
storylines, and seeking to improve narrative coherence (Blum-Kulka, Huck-Taglicht, & Avni,
2004; Nicolopoulou & Richner, 2004; Schick & Melzi, 2010). These exchanges resemble the
kinds of interactions characterizing exploratory talk but are less readily facilitated in preschool-
ers’ conversations with adults (Schick & Melzi, 2010). Importantly, such interactions can help
children appropriate skills that mediate performance on individual nonverbal reasoning tasks
(Rojas-Drummond, Pérez, Vélez, Gómez, & Mendoza, 2003; Wegerif, Mercer, & Dawes, 1999).
This Study
Bringing these perspectives together suggests that having preschoolers interact in small groups
during a shared narrative construction (i.e., storytelling) task without directive adult control could
stimulate them to reason about their thinking and benefit from each other’s knowledge and per-
spectives, which could in turn benefit their individual reasoning skills. As far as we can determine,
this combination of learning components has not previously been addressed in early childhood
education research. It is therefore not known how preschoolers will talk with each other under
these circumstances, nor whether this bears a relationship to outcomes on causal reasoning tasks.
Indeed, it is also possible that less effective types of interaction, such as those characterizing
disputational and cumulative talk, could occur.
This study aims to answer these questions by investigating the kinds of discourse elicited when
preschoolers take part in such a learning arrangement. Specifically, it examines whether different
outcomes on causal reasoning tasks reflect differences in the types of narrative statements and
peer interaction exhibited during a storytelling task. Based on the research discussed, it could be
expected that outcomes would be related to the extent to which narratives contain causal reasoning
(i.e., causal inferences, explanations, predictions) about story elements as well as the extent to
which children interact in ways characterizing exploratory, disputational, or cumulative talk.
To this end, children’s utterances during shared storytelling were investigated in terms of their
narrative and interactional functions, according to the theoretical framework described above.
The approach taken was to compare discourse in the groups that showed the lowest and the high-
est improvement on causal reasoning tasks, after a storytelling intervention in multiple groups.
This “diverse-cases” approach compares cases (here: groups) representing the range of variation
in outcomes (here: improvement in causal reasoning), to explore relationships between case char-
acteristics (here: discourse functions) and the outcome variable (Gerring, 2007). The results could
help generate hypotheses for future research on stimulating preschoolers’ causal reasoning.
In this study, as in other studies investigating preschoolers’ narrative abilities (e.g., Crawford
& Hade, 2000; O’Neill et al., 2004), picture sequences from picture books were used to create an
open-ended process in which children assign meaning to visual stimuli. Picture books are accessi-
ble, attractive, and authentic materials, specially made for and familiar to young children. To date,
picture book research has largely focused on their potential to promote language and literacy skills
and on parent–child interactions during shared reading (Fletcher & Reese, 2005; Mol, Bus, De
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372 REED ET AL.
Jong, & Smeets, 2008). Only a few studies have used picture books to stimulate other cognitive
and academic skills, such as promoting theory of mind understanding (e.g., Adrián, Clemente,
& Villanueva, 2007; Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, & Doyle, 2005), understanding math-
ematical concepts (e.g., Anderson, Anderson, & Shapiro, 2005; Van den Heuvel-Panhuizen &
Elia, 2011), and problem solving (e.g., Gosen, 2012). Furthermore, most picture book research
focuses on interactions between child and adult (e.g., parent, teacher); only a few studies focus
on interactions between children during picture book activities. Thus, this study also provides an
original contribution to picture book research in early childhood settings.
METHOD
Design
Three mainstream primary schools in The Netherlands with preschool classes took part in the
study. Dutch preschool is generally organized as separate classes within primary schools, where
children aged 4 to 6 years learn through play activities and other suitable experiences prior to the
commencement of formal education.
The study employed a pretest/posttest group design and cross-case (group) comparison fol-
lowing the “diverse-cases” approach described. Six storytelling groups (A to F) were formed
(two per school), each consisting of four to five children. Within schools, groups were made as
comparable as possible1 on age, sex, preintervention estimators of general cognitive functioning
and causal reasoning, home languages, parental level of education, home reading environment,
and the extent of liking books and magazines (see Participants and Measurement sections).
Descriptive statistics are in Table 1.
All groups participated in a 2-week storytelling intervention. Pre- to postintervention change
on three causal reasoning tasks (see Measurement section) was aggregated across all individuals
in a group. Kruskal-Wallis tests calculated group mean ranks for the aggregate change on each
TABLE 1
Group Descriptive Statistics Preintervention
School 1 School 2 School 3
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F
n = 5 n = 5 n = 5 n = 5 n = 4 n = 4
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Age (months) 64.6 7.1 62.6 6.5 63.0 4.3 65.4 5.1 65.8 4.7 63.8 3.3
IQ estimate 79.6 20.6 72.2 11.7 112.8 5.7 115.6 13.2 99.3 19.6 101.3 11.7
Working memory 5.2 3.3 7.0 3.5 8.4 1.8 6.8 1.1 3.8 2.5 6.3 1.9
Attention 16.4 1.7 12.4 14.2 19.6 0.9 19.2 1.8 17.0 4.7 19.8 0.5
Home reading environment 4.8 1.5 4.8 2.3 7.4 2.5 8.2 1.8 5.5 2.1 6.0 2.2
Liking for books & mags 2.8 0.4 2.6 0.5 2.2 0.8 3.0 0.0 2.8 0.5 2.5 0.6
Physical causality 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.1 2.0 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.5
Psychological causality 2.6 0.5 3.0 0.0 2.6 0.5 3.0 0.0 2.0 0.8 2.5 0.6
Situational causality 4.2 0.8 4.0 0.7 4.8 0.4 3.8 0.4 4.0 0.8 4.3 1.0
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CAUSAL REASONING AND PICTURE BOOK STORYTELLING 373
TABLE 2
Pretest-to-Posttest Change on Causal Reasoning Tasks
Physical
Causality
Psychological
Causality
Situational
Causality
Group N
Mean Pretest- to
Posttest
Duration (days) M SD M SD M SD
Kruskal-Wallis
Total Rank
A 5 45.80 0.20 1.30 0.00 0.71 −0.20 1.30 37.0
B 5 41.00 0.60 1.14 −0.40 0.89 0.60 0.89 41.8
C 5 45.00 0.60 1.14 0.20 0.45 −0.40 0.89 39.1
D 5 44.20 1.20 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.45 45.6
E 4 48.00 1.75 1.50 0.75 0.96 0.25 0.50 54.4
F 4 43.25 1.25 1.26 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.82 45.8
causal reasoning task; a total rank order for each group was then calculated (Table 2). The group
with the lowest total rank order (i.e., Group A; five children) and the group with the highest total
rank order (i.e., Group E; four children) were denoted as being the least-improving and the most-
improving groups, respectively. These groups were the subject of the cross-case comparison.
Participants
Participating schools received information packages for parents/caregivers of all children in their
preschool classes, excluding children whom teachers knew to have behavioral and/or attentional
deficits. The packages contained a letter about the purpose of the study, a request to participate,
an informed consent form, and a questionnaire containing demographic items (e.g., child’s sex
and age, home languages, parental level of education). The questionnaire also requested infor-
mation about the home reading environment and the child’s liking for books and magazines.
Home reading environment was operationalized as the extent to which different types of books
and magazines (i.e., storybooks, first picture books, picture books for preschoolers, early readers,
chapter books, information books, comic books, children’s magazines, other children’s books)
were available in the home. Liking for books and magazines was indicated on a 3-point scale as
does not like, likes a bit, or likes a lot.
Twenty-eight children who were comparable with other children at their school in terms of
age, background variables, and pretest scores were selected to participate in the storytelling inter-
vention. Of these, n = 15 (54%) were boys. Sample mean age was 64 months (SD = 5 m; range
54–72 m). Within each school, children were assigned to one of two storytelling groups.
Materials
Two picture books were used: the Dutch versions of Cave Baby (Donaldson & Gravett, 2010)
and Tom’s Elephant (Harvey & Klaassen, 1997) (see Appendix A). Books were selected on five
criteria. First, the story and illustrations were judged in children’s literature reviews to be of high
quality, captivating, and attractive to young children and adults. Second, a clear storyline could be
derived from the illustrations. Parts of the storyline and illustrations were amenable to different
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374 REED ET AL.
interpretations, however, which is considered to be a requirement of group tasks at primary school
level (Howe & Mercer, 2010). Third, the sequence of illustrations depicted situations that could
be explained by constructing a causal chain of events (i.e., a given situation could be understood
from information depicted in earlier situations). Fourth, the stories were fictional but situated in
meaningful contexts governed by natural laws. This precluded the use of books where magical
rather than causal forces could be used to explain the chain of events. Fifth, the selected books
were new to all participants (as verified by teachers), to ensure that earlier experiences did not
affect the results.
Procedure
Groups were supervised by three research assistants who were final-year master’s students in ped-
agogical sciences and fully trained in using the materials and protocols. Each group completed
three sessions per week for 2 weeks in a quiet room at school. In all sessions, the research assis-
tants encouraged the children to contribute to group storytelling without explicit control of turns.
Less active children were regularly given additional encouragement. Children were also encour-
aged to listen to each other. Importantly, the research assistants did not intervene with respect to
the content of what was said. A detailed protocol covered what instructions should be given, how
to display the picture book illustrations, how long to wait before turning a page, how to support
participation, and so on, and fidelity of the intervention was verified from digital recordings of
the storytelling sessions.
In the first two sessions (Week 1), the children were asked to generate a storyline together
while looking at the illustrations of Cave Baby. No child was able to read the text of the book.
The third session included a hand puppet as a prop. Following O’Neill et al. (2004), the children
were told that the puppet loved stories and had not heard this one before. They then were asked
to tell the story while looking at the illustrations. The presence of a “naïve” listener can be an
extra stimulus for children to articulate their reasoning more than they would to a knowledgeable
listener. This procedure was repeated in Week 2 using Tom’s Elephant.
Importantly, children were allowed as much time as they wished to tell the stories, so that
each group ultimately spent a different amount of time on the intervention. The first two sessions
lasted 25 minutes on average (range 13–29), while the third session lasted 22 minutes on average
(range 7–34). Storytelling sessions were digitally recorded; six recordings (17%) were lost due
to technical failures.
Measurement
Pretests and Posttests
Children were individually tested on general cognitive functioning and causal reasoning (i.e.,
physical, psychological, and situational causality). Pretests were performed an average of 23 days
(range 11–34) before the intervention and posttests an average of 11 days (range 3–33) after.
Mean number of days between pretests and posttests for each group is indicated in Table 2.
Children were tested by a research assistant in a quiet room. Test sessions lasted 49 minutes on
average (range 30–65).
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CAUSAL REASONING AND PICTURE BOOK STORYTELLING 375
General cognitive functioning was measured using well-known, validated tests, administered
following their standard protocols. To estimate intellectual abilities, the Vocabulary and Block
Design subtests of the Dutch version of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-
Third Edition (WPPSI-III-NL; Hendriksen & Hurks, 2009) were administered. Combining these
subtests gives a reliable estimate of children’s intelligence (Sattler & Dumont, 2004). The
Vocabulary subtest comprises 25 items to be named or defined (max raw score 45). The Block
Design subtest requires 20 visually presented patterns to be reproduced (max raw score 40).
Raw scores for the two subtests were transformed to standard scores and a total IQ estimator
calculated following the standard procedure. Working memory was assessed with a computer-
ized visual-spatial grid task in which sequences of dots have to be remembered and reproduced
(Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002; max score 16). Attention was measured as accuracy
on the “Cats” task of the Developmental Neuropsychological Assessment (NEPSY) visual atten-
tion subtest, which requires the subject to search for a target embedded in a random array of
different pictures within a set time (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998; max raw score 20).
Physical causality was measured with an instrument derived from Das Gupta and Bryant
(1989). Pairs of picture sequences were presented, each showing an object in an initial state
followed by that object in an end state. The initial state was noncanonical in one way (e.g., a wet
cup or a broken cup), whereas the end state was noncanonical in two ways (e.g., a wet, broken
cup). The child had to select one of two agents (e.g., faucet or hammer) that could cause the
end state from the initial state. Both agents are needed to cause the end state from the canonical
state of the object; however, only one is needed to cause the end state from an initial state in
which one transformation has already taken place. To be correct on both sequences in a pair, chil-
dren needed to make a causal inference about the change between the initial and end state of the
depicted object. In the example, the hammer is the agent for the sequence “wet cup - wet, broken
cup” and the faucet is the agent for the sequence “broken cup - wet, broken cup.” In total, eight
sequences were presented (i.e., four pairs). The two sequences of a pair were never presented
consecutively. The number of pairs for which both sequences were correct was summed to give a
total score (max 4).
Psychological causality was measured with an instrument developed by the research team.
Children were presented with a picture of a psychological state and had to indicate which of three
other pictures showed a causal antecedent. For example, an angry rabbit was shown. Possible
causal antecedents showed the rabbit raking a pile of leaves together in the presence of another
character who was acting in three different ways: (1) lying calmly, (2) jumping onto the pile of
leaves, (3) moving out of the scene. The instrument comprised three such items.
Situational causality was measured with a similar 5-item instrument developed by the research
team. Children were presented with a picture of a situation and had to indicate which of three
other pictures showed a causal antecedent. For example, a character was shown covered in cake
mix and throwing back his arms in surprise with an upturned mixing bowl on a table in front of
him. Possible causal antecedents were: (1) a ball heading straight for the bowl, (2) a stationary
ball under the table, (3) a ball knocking the table over and the contents of the bowl to the ground.
Group Discourse
Discourse in the groups showing the lowest and the highest improvement in causal reasoning
postintervention (i.e., Groups A and E, respectively) was investigated through qualitative content
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analysis, involving systematic observation, coding, and analysis of children’s verbal utterances in
terms of their narrative and interactional functions.
Seven mutually exclusive narrative categories were defined: four noncausal categories (i.e.,
labeling, observation, elaboration, other) and three categories of causal reasoning (i.e., causal
inference, prediction, explanation). Similar categories were used in previous research (e.g.,
Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Paris & Paris, 2003; Walsh, 2003; see Introduction); we added the
category “elaboration” to designate statements related to prior knowledge and a category “other”
to capture nonspecific, non-narrative, or incomprehensible statements. Definitions and examples
of each category are given in Appendix B.1.
Seven mutually exclusive interactional categories were derived from previous research on chil-
dren’s talk in primary school classrooms described in the Introduction (Howe & Mercer, 2010).
Three categories were used to capture types of interaction found in exploratory talk (i.e., exten-
sion, clarification, challenge). Two categories identified disputational and cumulative interactions,
respectively. We added a category “assertion” to designate self-contained claims about story ele-
ments and a category “other” for nonspecific or incomprehensible statements. Definitions and
examples of each category are given in Appendix B.2.
All video recordings for both groups were transcribed and coded. One Group A recording was
missing. Transcriptions excluded utterances unrelated to the task. Utterances were segmented into
speech units, defined as a single meaningful unit of information serving one or more functions
of interest to the study. Each speech unit was assigned a single narrative category and a single
interactional category; thus, each speech unit had exactly two functional codes. This system is
illustrated in Figure 1 (translated from the original Dutch). Coding reliability was confirmed for
25% of the transcribed corpus by a colleague who was trained in using the coding protocols
and who was blind to the study hypotheses and the group differences. Percentage agreement for
both types of codes was 80%. Inter-rater reliability was further tested using Krippendorff’s α
coefficient for nominal data; coefficients of .72 for narrative codes and .76 for interactional codes
indicate acceptable reliability.
Cross-Case Analysis
Discourse in the groups showing the lowest and the highest improvement in causal reasoning
post intervention (i.e., Groups A and E, respectively) was analyzed. Analyses were performed in
IBM SPSS Statistics 20 (α = .05). For both groups, discourse duration was calculated as the total
amount of time spent on the intervention across all storytelling sessions. Discourse participation
of individual group members was calculated as a proportion of the total number of speech units
per group. Spearman’s rank-order correlation was calculated to establish the relationship between
discourse participation and improvement in causal reasoning. Discourse development over time
was analyzed for both groups by calculating the proportion of the total number of speech units
coded in each category per storytelling session and comparing these proportions across sessions
using the chi-squared test and Fisher’s exact tests. Comparison of discourse between groups was
done by aggregating the number of occurrences of each coding category across sessions per
group and obtaining patterns of narrative and interactional talk from the proportions represented
by each category. These patterns were compared using the chi-squared test and Fisher’s exact
tests.
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FIGURE 1 Example transcription coding.
RESULTS
Discourse Duration and Participation
The groups spent notably different amounts of time on the intervention: Group A (i.e., lowest
improvement) spent a total of 1 hour, 23 minutes (M = 14 min/session), whereas Group E (i.e.,
highest improvement) spent 2 hours, 38 minutes (M = 26 min/session).
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TABLE 3
Groups A and E: Causal Reasoning Scores and Discourse Participation
Total Causal Reasoning Score
Pretest Posttest Change Discourse Participation (%)
Group A:
Child 1 8 4 −4 1.7
Child 2 11 10 −1 25.7
Child 3 6 9 3 16.6
Child 4 9 8 −1 29.6
Child 5 6 9 3 26.2
Average 8 8 0
Group E:
Child 1 4 7 3 30.1
Child 2 8 12 4 18.9
Child 3 8 10 2 37.3
Child 4 7 9 2 13.7
Average 6.75 9.5 2.75
Note. Maximum causal reasoning score = 12.
Table 3 presents scores on the causal reasoning tasks and discourse participation percent-
ages for individual group members. There was no significant relationship between discourse
participation and improvement in causal reasoning (ρ = .18, p = .64).
Narrative Talk
Group A produced mainly labeling (31.7%), inferences (24.2%), and “other” statements (21.8%).
Narrative category proportions changed over time, χ2(24) = 71.62, p < .001; specifically,
labeling decreased after the first session (p < .05). Group E exhibited talk that was more
diverse and balanced, with substantial proportions of labeling (17.8%), observations (15.0%),
inferences (17.5%), and “other” statements (26.6%). Over time, χ2(30) = 80.89, p < .001,
inferences increased by the end of the intervention and predictions peaked in Sessions 2 and 3
(both p < .05).
Between groups, patterns were significantly different, χ2(6) = 98.78, p < .001, with a higher
proportion of labeling and inferences in Group A and a higher proportion of observations, expla-
nations, and “other” statements in Group E (all p < .05). Group differences were not significant
for elaborations and predictions. Results summarized across all sessions are presented in Figure 2
and session statistics are available in the Supplementary Materials.
Excerpts from the transcriptions are illustrative of these differences. First, much of Group
A discourse went no further than identifying perceptual features of the stimulus (i.e., labeling).
By comparison, Group E discourse contained more detailed descriptions or interpretations of
perceptual features (i.e., observations). The following example from Cave Baby concerns stimuli
representing a sabre-toothed tiger and a hyena. Group A statements concerning these stimuli were
typically: “I see a tiger,” “A tiger and an elephant,” “This is a tiger with sharp teeth,” “A zebra”
(i.e., the hyena), “That’s not a zebra, that’s a wolf,” “That’s a long tiger.” Group E, on the other
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FIGURE 2 Narrative category percentage occurrence across sessions per
group.
hand, made several observations focusing on the tiger’s teeth: “There’s a great big tiger with
a sharp tooth,” “He is big and the tooth is big but this is a bit smaller and his body is bigger
than the tooth,” “Do you know how big the teeth are? Longer than . . . ,” “But this is longer
than this and big, but this is even longer.” Then, when they encountered the picture of the hyena
and took it to represent the same tiger, the children continued to focus on its teeth: “But his
big teeth are a bit broken now.” This then led them to offer an explanation of why the teeth were
smaller in the picture of the hyena, during which they invoked the causal mechanism that chewing
grass breaks teeth. Thus, producing more detailed descriptions and interpretations of perceptual
features may stimulate causal reasoning by drawing attention to situations or events that invite or
need explanation.
A second difference concerns the use of inferences (i.e., connections between situations or
events inferred from the stimulus) and explanations (i.e., references to causal mechanisms).
In Tom’s Elephant, the stimulus is a picture of the elephant getting free of shackles after being
chained up. Group A discourse consisted of several simple inferences:
Child 1: “The elephant is free.”
Child 2: “He broke everything.”
Child 2: “He sucked it all up with his trunk.”
Child 3: “Yes, and by stamping.”
In Group E, discourse about the same stimulus went as follows:
Child 1: “Maybe he wants a strong wind, maybe he stamped really hard.”
Child 2: “Look here, do you know why this opened? Look, he stamps really hard and then he goes
there to that side and then he also goes again.”
Child 3: “I think that he sees water there and that he. . . .”
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Child 3: “And that he, no, that his legs are really strong so the cuffs around his leg break.”
Child 4: “Look, the elephant has strong claws and then he goes like boom boom and breaks the locks
and that iron.”
These excerpts show that, while Group A’s causal reasoning was limited to drawing simple infer-
ences about the stimuli, Group E engaged in reasoning about the causal mechanisms that could
underlie the depicted situation.
Interactional Talk
Almost one third of all statements in both groups was in the form of self-contained assertions.
Both groups also produced a substantial proportion of extensions (Group A: 16.7%; Group E:
19.7%). Group A was further characterized by cumulative (15.5%) and disputational (12.1%)
interactions, whereas Group E produced a sizeable proportion of clarifications (13.9%). In Group
A, interactional category proportions did not change over time, χ2(24) = 28.63, p = .23. In Group
E, χ2(30) = 69.49, p < .001, assertions increased after the first session, while there were fewer
clarifications in the last session than in the first (both p < .05).
Between groups, patterns were significantly different, χ2(6) = 58.16, p < .001. There was a
higher proportion of cumulative and disputational talk in Group A, while Group E produced more
clarifications (all p < .05). Group differences were not significant for assertions, extensions, chal-
lenges, or “other” interactions. Results summarized across all sessions are presented in Figure 3
and session statistics are available in the Supplementary Materials.
To illustrate: in Cave Baby, the stimulus was a picture of the baby and the mammoths playing
amid big splashes of color. Group A discourse was as follows:
Child 1: “They’re setting off fireworks.”
Child 2: “No.”
FIGURE 3 Interactional category percentage occurrence across sessions
per group.
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Child 1: “Yes!
Child 3: “No, they are painting.”
Child 1: “No, fireworks!”
Child 4: “Painting!”
Child 1: “Fireworks!”
Child 4: “Painting!”
Child 1: “Fireworks, fireworks, fireworks!”
Child 2: “Yes, they are painting.”
Child 3: “Yes.”
Child 1: “No!”
Child 3: “Yes!”
Child 1: “They are painting and setting off fireworks.”
Child 1: “They’re setting off painted fireworks.”
Child 3: “Yes, that could be.”
Child 1: “I’m right!”
Clearly, little or no causal reasoning is stimulated by these interactions, which contain little more
than confirmations and repetitions (i.e., cumulative talk), simple rebuttals, and reassertions (i.e.,
disputational talk). By comparison, an excerpt illustrating the clarifications distinguishing Group
E involves a discussion about whether the mammoth is using his trunk to point with in one scene
of Cave Baby:
Child 1: “He wants to go to the baby otherwise he’ll run away.”
Child 2: “Look, look, this is pointing there.”
Child 1: “Yes, because he’s got hands but then he’ll fall on his behind.”
Child 2: “No.”
Child 1: “Yes, he’s got hands but they’re a bit flat here [gestures] and we’ve got hands like this
[gestures].”
Child 2: “I don’t know what she means.”
Child 3: “Really?”
Child 3: “Look, he’s pointing with his trunk.”
Child 3: “Look, look, then he can’t really do like this . . . so.”
Child 4: “I think it’s pointing to him.”
This excerpt shows Group E children explicitly justifying their statements. Starting from the
notion that the trunk could be pointing, Child 1 tries to justify (anatomically) why the mammoth
would point with his trunk rather than with his feet (here, hands), and is stimulated to become
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more explicit by Child 2 not accepting her arguments. As seen here, clarifications may involve
causal reasoning being made visible and may result in agreement being reached.
DISCUSSION
This study examines discourse elicited when preschoolers participate in undirected, shared pic-
ture book storytelling within a peer-group setting. As far as we can determine, this combination of
learning components has not previously been investigated in early childhood education research,
and the study therefore provides an original contribution to several lines of research described
in the Introduction. The issue to be investigated is how preschoolers talk with each other under
these circumstances and whether differences in the types of discourse elicited by the storytelling
task reflect different outcomes on causal reasoning tasks. On the one hand, the learning arrange-
ment could stimulate children to share their knowledge, experiences, and perspectives in forming
coherent causally sequenced plots, which could help to improve causal reasoning skills. On the
other hand, less effective types of talk could occur and this could be related to lower outcomes on
causal reasoning tasks.
Twenty-eight children from three preschools were placed in six groups and asked to generate
narratives together from picture book stimuli in the absence of directive adult control of the
discourse. Discourse then was compared in the two groups that showed the lowest and the highest
improvement on causal reasoning tasks post intervention. The main differences between these
groups are presented in Figure 4.
Regarding narrative statements, relatively more labeling and simple inferences were produced
by the least-improving group, whereas relatively more causal explanations were produced by the
most-improving group, often in relation to detailed interpretations of perceptual features. There
were no group differences in causal predictions. This suggests that engaging in explanations
FIGURE 4 Group discourse differences.
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CAUSAL REASONING AND PICTURE BOOK STORYTELLING 383
invoking causal mechanisms could play a key role in improving causal reasoning, lending sup-
port to previous findings regarding the importance of children’s explanations in learning and
thinking. Causal explanations—particularly of surprising events or inconsistent outcomes—are
thought to be especially powerful in influencing children’s causal reasoning and causal learning
(Legare et al., 2010; Wellman & Liu, 2007), and young children make use of causal-explanatory
theories to make sense of real-life happenings (Hickling & Wellman, 2001). In addition, the
most-improving group showed increased use of causal inferences and predications across ses-
sions, while the least-improving group showed no growth in types of causal reasoning displayed
during the intervention. Taken together, this strongly suggests that outcomes on causal reason-
ing tasks are affected by the extent to which causal reasoning is elicited when children construct
narratives together.
This could be mediated by the types of peer interaction that arise during the storytelling
task. Intriguingly, the groups displayed patterns of interaction that show considerable similari-
ties to patterns found with older children; moreover, the relationship between these patterns and
learning outcomes also appears similar to what is found with older children (Howe & Mercer,
2010; Rojas-Drummond et al., 2003; Wegerif et al., 1999). Children in the most-improving group
engaged critically but constructively with each other’s ideas and explicitly offered justifications of
their statements for joint consideration. In contrast, the least-improving group was distinguished
by exchanges typifying what is known as disputational and cumulative talk, both of which are
associated with lower learning outcomes (Howe & Mercer, 2010). Taken together, these findings
suggest that group discourse beneficial to causal reasoning in preschoolers may be characterized
by the kinds of interactions known as exploratory talk, but also support the view that placing
children in groups does not guarantee exchanges that are likely to enhance learning (Howe &
Mercer, 2010).
The study design allowed differing amounts of time to be spent on the intervention, as deter-
mined by the children themselves. Notably, the most-improving group spent the most time on the
intervention, while the least-improving group spent the least. This strongly suggests that dura-
tion of shared storytelling experiences could be influential. Specifically, more productive types of
narrative thinking or peer interaction could emerge only in later stages of discourse.
Finally, it is worth noting that discourse participation was not balanced; discourse was dom-
inated by two or three group members, whereas others contributed much less. This concurs
with previous findings on unstructured discussions (Howe & Mercer, 2010). As a lack of active
contribution does not preclude children from benefiting from the knowledge and perspectives
made visible by others (e.g., vicarious learning, observational learning), the relationship between
active participation and learning in this study is unclear, particularly as there was no significant
relationship between discourse participation and improvement in causal reasoning.
Individual Differences
As noted at the start of this article, individual differences in children’s causal knowledge and
experience stem largely from variability in home context. Variations in narrative abilities are
also associated with socio-cultural-economic background and home context (Lever & Sénéchal,
2011; Peterson et al., 1999; Schick & Melzi, 2010). Furthermore, the effectiveness of interaction
processes depends on social histories and past experiences as well as individual characteristics
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
r P
au
l A
. K
irs
ch
ne
r] 
at 
11
:38
 22
 Ju
ne
 20
15
 
384 REED ET AL.
that affect the quality of children’s discussion with peers (Howe & McWilliam, 2001; Howe &
Mercer, 2010). Thus, individual differences between children could affect how they participate in
shared storytelling and the discourse patterns shown. For example, children’s prior knowledge of
and experience with books and storytelling affects how they make sense of picture book stimuli
(Crawford & Hade, 2000), while the extent to which their social experiences outside school stim-
ulate reasoned argumentation affects how they negotiate and justify their reasoning in interactions
with peers (Ehrlich, 2011; Howe & McWilliam, 2001; Howe & Mercer, 2010).
In this case, it is possible that members of the two groups possessed different narrative and
interactional skill levels at study commencement that affected their ability to respond to the
learning arrangement and consequently the kind of discourse that arose. If members of the
least-improving group did not possess sufficient skill to engage constructively with each other
in the storytelling task, this could explain why they were unable to capitalize on their slight pre-
intervention advantage in causal reasoning skill (see Table 3). Clearly, it is important to investigate
the influence of different narrative and interactional skill levels in future studies.
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
As stated, this may be the first study investigating how undirected shared picture book storytelling
in a peer-group setting could stimulate causal reasoning in preschoolers. Although its small-
scale nature does not permit definite conclusions to be drawn about the effects of the learning
arrangement, it does allow detailed, in-depth examination of the discourse that takes place. This,
in turn, helps generate hypotheses that should be tested in future research on a larger scale and
using a broader range of causal reasoning tasks.
First, it appears that preschoolers can interact in ways similar to exploratory talk taught to older
children and that this benefits their learning. Therefore, it would be of interest to investigate the
extent to which preschoolers can explicitly learn and use ground rules for exploratory talk and the
effects on learning. Second, it appears that discourse involving causal explanations and detailed
interpretations of perceptual features is beneficial to causal reasoning. A question to be resolved,
therefore, is how to stimulate children to move past superficial reactions to deeper treatment of the
material. Third, more time spent on storytelling appears to be related to better outcomes, possibly
because discourse becomes more productive after some time has elapsed. Research focusing on
the temporal dimension of discourse progression with preschoolers should investigate this issue
(Mercer, 2008).
If these hypotheses are confirmed, it would be important to investigate how children can be
engaged in the intervention for longer periods of time. The traveling lens model of attention
used in literacy and television-viewing research (e.g., Linebarger, Moses, Garrity Liebeskind, &
McMenamin, 2013) posits that children’s interest in and attention to stimuli depends on stimu-
lus features (e.g., novelty, complexity, recognizability) in relation to individual dispositions. This
gives pointers for investigating how many sessions—as a function of picture book character-
istics and individual or group dispositions—are optimal for arousing and sustaining children’s
interest and attention and for manipulating the complexity and novelty of stimuli. For example,
picture books could be used that present multiple storylines simultaneously, so that children have
to move backward and forward through the book to seek connections between story elements
(Wolfenbarger & Sipe, 2007).
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The study did not examine the influence of individual differences on the results. However, as
noted, differences between children could affect how they participate in shared storytelling and
the discourse patterns shown. It is important to untangle these influences in future studies.
Finally, future research could examine the effects of increasing the adult’s role in the
discourse—for example, through the kinds of strategies used in research with older children.
These include the use of open questions to explore children’s ideas, allowing children plenty of
time to express what they are thinking, encouraging them to clarify and justify their views, and
modeling these kinds of interactions so that children can learn by example (Mercer & Howe,
2012).
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
This study contributes to a line of research that aims to provide early childhood educators with
accessible and low-threshold methods and materials that stimulate young children’s thinking
skills (e.g., Bodrova & Leong, 2007; Diamond, Barnett, Thomas, & Munroe, 2007). This could
help to improve young children’s school readiness, which is an issue of major importance to edu-
cators, the public, and politicians (e.g., National School Readiness Indicators Initiative and Head
Start program in the United States, Head Start in Australia, and Sure Start program in the United
Kingdom).
In this regard, it is important to note that fully authentic materials, familiar and accessible to
early childhood educators and young children, were used here. Picture books were selected on
the basis of criteria that nonresearchers could easily learn to apply and were not shortened or
adapted, as is often the case in education research. Moreover, the small-group setting increases
the ecological validity of the approach, as schools rarely have sufficient resources to carry out
such activities on a one-to-one basis.
The role of the adult in this study was to create conditions for active, open, and equitable
group discourse, rather than to direct or control it—an approach shown to facilitate learning in
peer groups (Mercer & Howe, 2012). If future research confirms that these conditions are effec-
tive for preschoolers, this would have pedagogical implications. First, early childhood educators
need to become aware of the value and possibility of promoting exploratory talk with young
children and of creating a climate and conditions that support this kind of talk. This study indi-
cates that such talk during a shared storytelling task may promote important reasoning skills that
are not typically stimulated by other activities in early education settings. Regarding causal rea-
soning specifically, conditions include providing surprising or ambiguous learning materials and
giving children ample time to move past more superficial reactions (e.g., labeling of perceptual
stimuli) to deeper treatment of the material. In this, educators may need to guide children toward
potentially relevant cues, for example, by encouraging them to observe and explain story events
(Girard, Girolametto, Weitzman, & Greenberg, 2013).
Furthermore, educators need to learn how to employ strategies for facilitating effective dis-
course and avoiding less effective (e.g., disputational and cumulative) types of discourse. It may
be difficult for educators with more directive styles to resist the temptation to control the content
of children’s responses in their habitual ways, for example requiring children to produce “cor-
rect” answers (Howe & Mercer, 2010). In short, educators need to learn how to manage discourse
that needs guidance in form but freedom in content.
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APPENDIX A: PICTURE BOOK MATERIALS
Cave Baby (Donaldson & Gravett, 2010) is situated in prehistoric times, where a baby lives with
his parents in a cave. His mother paints animals on the walls of the cave. Cave Baby decides to
join in by adding splashes of paint to the walls; this angers his parents, however. Come night,
Cave Baby is kidnapped by a mammoth who takes him on a ride through a moonlit landscape
populated by different animals to his own cave. There, Cave Baby happily paints and plays with
the mammoths. Finally, the mammoth takes Cave Baby back home to bed. The book comprises
32 pages with color illustrations.
In Tom’s Elephant (Harvey & Klaassen, 1997), a circus comes to Tom’s town. Tom is awak-
ened one night by a strange noise. An elephant has run away from the circus and is hiding in the
garage. Tom and the elephant become friends and the elephant helps Tom to do his paper rounds
and punishes the school bully by putting him up in a tree. Tom tries to hide the elephant but the
police find him and lock him up in chains. A violent storm arises and the town is flooded. The
elephant escapes and rescues people from the water. The townsfolk hail him as a hero and send
him on a boat back home to Africa. The book comprises 25 pages with color illustrations.
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE NARRATIVE AND INTERACTIONAL CATEGORIES
TABLE B.1
Narrative Categories
Category Definition Examples
Labeling Naming or identifying perceived features of
the stimulus without further information
“There is paint”; “The baby is waving”
Observation Description or interpretation of perceptual
features that goes beyond labeling
“He is big and the tooth is big but this is a bit smaller
and his body is bigger than the tooth”
Elaboration Information about the stimulus that represents
prior knowledge
“Look, you can fold up these steps and then you can
drive it [i.e., a caravan] with a car”; “Zebras don’t
have hair there”
Inference Statement about a connection between actions,
events, characters, or psychological
variables that is inferred from the stimulus
“They want to kill the mouse”; “The baby’s
frightened of the elephant”
Prediction Expression of an expected outcome of a
depicted or inferred action or event
“The elephant’s going to pull him out of there”;
“The mother is going to think that the baby made
those tracks”
Explanation Reference to a causal mechanism to explain a
depicted or inferred action, event, or
psychological state
“Do you know why the window is open? Because the
elephant stamps really hard and makes a wind that
blows there”; “They’re walking next to the father
so that’s why you can see them in the water”
Other Nonspecific, non-narrative, or
incomprehensible statement
“Wow!”; “I think the baby is cute”; “What do you
mean?”; “Yes”
TABLE B.2
Interactional Categories
Category Definition Examples
Assertion Self-contained claim about a story element “That’s a circus for sure”
Extension Additional thought about or elaboration on
a previous statement
Second part of the exchange: “He is looking behind
him”/“He doesn’t want to be seen and has to hide
somewhere”
Clarification Provides or requests information justifying
or clarifying a previous statement
“It’s a circus because there’s a clown here”; “What
do you mean?”
Challenge Alternative interpretation of a previous
statement accompanied by a justification
of that interpretation
“No, it’s a swimming pool [as opposed to a ditch]
because there’s a pool-ladder there”
Cumulative Statement that builds positively but
uncritically on an earlier statement,
characterized by confirmation, repetition,
or completion of an unfinished statement
“He is right”; second part of the exchange: “And
then he has a fright so he lets go of his
torch”/“Then he has a fright and drops his torch”;
second part of the exchange: “That’s a big.
. . .”/“Bath”
Disputational Disagreement in the form of a simple
rebuttal or reassertion without further
justification or elaboration
“No it isn’t”; “Yes it is”
Other Nonspecific or incomprehensible statement “Woh!”
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